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Abstract
One recently popular way to characterise strong emergence is to say that emergent entities possess novel causal powers. 
However, there is little agreement concerning the nature of powers. One controversy involves whether powers are single- or 
multi-track; that is, whether each power has only one manifestation type, or whether a single power can be directed towards 
a number of distinct manifestations. Another concerns how powers operate: whether a lone power manifests when triggered 
by the presence of a suitable stimulus, or whether powers operate mutually such that several powers must ‘work together’ to 
bring about a particular manifestation. This paper examines how these distinctions—which can be cross-combined to frame 
four distinct accounts of the nature of powers—bear on the debate between emergentists and reductionists.
Keywords Emergence · Reduction · Powers · Single-track · Multi-track · Stimulus · Manifestation · Mutual manifestation
1 Introduction
Emergentists hold that higher-level phenomena, such as the 
mind, are something ‘over and above’ the sum of their most 
basic parts. This usually involves the emergent phenomena 
being taken to be both distinct from and novel with respect to 
the base phenomena from which they emerge, whilst never-
theless being dependent upon the base phenomena. How dis-
tinctness and novelty should be understood depends on the 
kind of emergence being proposed: epistemically emergent 
higher-level phenomena are indispensable features of certain 
explanatory or predictive practices; whereas with metaphysi-
cally emergent phenomena their ‘over and above-ness’ is 
a matter of ontology. This division of kinds of emergence 
into epistemic and metaphysical is neither exhaustive nor 
maximally specific, but it should be sufficient for the pur-
poses of this paper. For those interested in a more nuanced 
division, there has been a lot of recent work on varieties of 
emergence, see for instance: Chalmers (2006), Silberstein 
(2001), van Gulick (2001) and Wilson (2015).
This paper focusses on the ontological debate between 
emergentists and reductionists, with special attention paid 
to the thesis that the mind is a strongly emergent entity. To 
hold that the mental reduces to the neurological or physi-
cal ontologically involves commitment to the claim that the 
mind is nothing over and above some underlying physical 
entity such as the brain—prima facie distinctively mental 
phenomena such as thoughts, emotions and experiences are 
fully constituted by or identical with purely physical phe-
nomena such as electro-chemical brain processes.
One popular way to characterise a strong form of meta-
physical emergence is to say that emergent entities must 
possess novel causal powers. For instance, Jaegwon Kim 
asserts that if emergentism is to be a coherent position, 
then emergent entities must have distinctive causal powers 
(1999). Timothy O’Connor and Hong Yu Wong characterise 
emergent properties as basic properties had by composite 
entities; where ‘basicness’ is at least in part a matter of con-
ferring novel causal powers (2005). Jessica Wilson takes 
strongly metaphysically emergent entities to have “funda-
mentally novel powers” (2015, p. 356). According to these 
sorts of view, a strongly emergent mind would have to be 
poised to make a distinctive causal contribution to the world, 
one which exceeds the causal potential of the base entities 
from which it emerges. Whilst this powers-based approach 
to strong emergence is not the only possible view, the dis-
cussion in this paper will be restricted to a conception of 
emergence whereby for some entity E to be an emergent 
entity, E must have causal powers which are not had by the 
base entities, the Bs, upon which E depends.
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2  Why Understand Emergence in Terms 
of Causal Powers?
There are a number of compelling reasons to frame strong 
metaphysical emergence in terms of the possession of dis-
tinct, novel causal powers. First, suppose, for the sake of 
argument, that E is a higher-level object which is dependent 
on some set of lower-level objects, the Bs, but that E pos-
sesses causal powers which are genuinely distinct from and 
novel with respect to the causal powers possessed by the Bs. 
Remember that the issue at stake, in terms of strong meta-
physical emergence, is whether there exist any higher-level 
entities which are properly characterised as ‘over-and-above’ 
the lower level entities upon which they depend. E’s having 
its own causal efficacy which cannot be attributed to the 
Bs looks like evidence par excellence that E is something 
over and above the Bs; that E ought to be accorded genuine 
irreducible ontological status. If it were not, then it seems 
that there would be no entity to which to attribute this causal 
efficacy, and this seems absurd.
Second, having a distinctive causal role seems the appro-
priate criterion for picking out strong forms of metaphysical 
emergence. Suppose that there could be grounds for thinking 
that some higher-level entity  E1 was in some sense meta-
physically, and not merely epistemically—that is, merely 
with regards to explanatory or predictive practices—distinct 
from and novel with respect to the lower-level entities, the 
Bs, upon which it depends.  E1 might well count as meta-
physically emergent, then. But compare  E1 to a higher-level 
entity  E2 which does have its own novel causal powers—it 
seems very natural to see the latter as emergent in a stronger 
sense than the former. This kind of distinction between 
strong and weak metaphysical emergence can be found, for 
instance, in Wilson (2015).
Third, to the extent to which one has confidence in sci-
ence’s ability to trace causal goings-on, adopting a powers-
based conception of strong emergence promises to help 
make the debate between emergentists and reductionists 
empirically tractable—at least in part.1 This is something 
that all parties to the debate ought to agree is desirable. For 
arguments in favour of the claim that one of the central roles 
of science, especially the physical sciences, is to trace causal 
goings-on, see for instance, Blackburn (1990) or Hawthorne 
(2001).
Fourth, adopting a power-based conception of emergence 
will not only be attractive to emergentists, as its combina-
tion with various forms of causal exclusion argument (see 
e.g. Kim 1999) provides a clear framework and procedure 
for reductionism [this point is nicely elaborated in Elder 
(2003)]. Having a conception that both emergentists and 
reductionists can agree upon is crucial for the debate. If 
Smith is an emergentist concerning entities in some domain, 
but Jones is reductionist about them, and Smith and Jones 
subscribe to differing conceptions of emergence, then there 
is a very strong chance that there is only the appearance of 
genuine disagreement between them—Smith and Jones may 
well simply be talking past one another. The form of reduc-
tion that stems from the acceptance of a powers-based con-
ception might also be thought attractive because it is clear 
to see how it can be distinguished from eliminativism—if E 
reduces to the Bs, as all of E’s causal powers can be identi-
fied with causal powers of the Bs, then according to this 
view E still exists—we have just been ascribing causal pow-
ers to E! E does not, however, exist as distinct from or novel 
with respect to the Bs: E is nothing over and above the Bs.
See Carruth (forthcoming) for further discussion of 
causal powers in the emergence debate, especially regard-
ing the role played by ‘Alexander’s dictum’ in this context.
3  Causal Powers
Causal powers are features or properties of objects in virtue 
of which the objects that instantiate them causally interact in 
the manner that they do.2 Objects with just the same causal 
powers will behave in the same way when placed in exactly 
similar circumstances. Objects with different causal pow-
ers will behave differently, and this difference in behaviour 
will be due to their instantiating different causal powers. 
Views such as strong versions of dispositional essentialism 
hold that all fundamental properties are causal powers (see 
Shoemaker 1980). Others take causal powers to depend on 
or reduce to a combination of non-causal properties and 
the laws of nature (e.g. Armstrong 1997). Others still take 
some fundamental properties to be powers, and others no 
to be (e.g. Molnar 2003). This paper will not aim to settle 
1 Why just in part? If the arguments put forward in this paper are 
correct, then the debate is also sensitive to distinctively metaphysical 
questions concerning the identity and individuation of powers, and 
these questions are not to be settled empirically. But empirical evi-
dence will still be relevant for establishing candidate cases of emer-
gence, and for assessing the plausibility of candidate reductions—see 
Robb (2018) for a recent discussion of this issue in the context of 
emergent mental causation.
2 In this paper I talk in the familiar terms of objects and their proper-
ties (remaining neutral on whether properties should be understood 
as universals or as particulars), which is suggestive of a two-category 
ontology. Alternative basic ontologies are of course available—for 
instance, if one favours a one-category trope ontology, then object-
talk should be reconstrued in terms of bundles; instantiation-talk in 
terms of a bundling-relation (and of course this distinction does not 
exhaust the options: some opt for richer categorial structures includ-
ing, for instance, events or kinds). I do not think anything said in this 
paper should be sensitive to these distinctions.
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this dispute. However, it should be noted that the various 
approaches to the nature of powers to be discussed in this 
paper have been developed within frameworks which adopt 
a robust, metaphysically serious attitude towards powers—
those approaching the issue from the perspective of neo-
Humean metaphysics may be less likely to be attracted to the 
powers-based conception of emergence, and less amenable 
to the various views on the nature of powers set out in sec-
tion four.
Causal powers are essentially powers to something or 
other. That is, their nature involves being directed towards 
some manifestation or set of manifestations; and they bring 
about these manifestations in suitable circumstances. Canon-
ical examples of causal powers include for instance fragility, 
which could be roughly characterised as ‘the power to break 
when struck’, or solubility, ‘the power to dissolve when in 
contact with a suitable solvent’. We can roughly capture 
these features using conditional statements of the form:
CP x has the power to φ if it is the case that were x to be 
placed in suitable circumstances C, then x would φ.
I don’t offer CP as an analysis of what it is to have a 
power, although some philosophers have attempted to ana-
lyse powers in terms of the truth of conditional statements 
[e.g Lewis (1997); such analyses are plagued by familiar 
counterexamples, however, see Martin (1994) and Bird 
(1998)]. But conditional statements such as CP, even if they 
fail to analyse what it is to have a power, capture at the cen-
tral features of powers mentioned above: their directedness 
and their sensitivity to circumstance.
There are several controversies in the debate concerning 
the nature of powers. One concerns whether causal powers 
are ‘single-’ or ‘multi-track’; that is, whether a given power 
only ever disposes its bearer towards a single manifestation 
or whether an object can be disposed towards a range of 
manifestations just in virtue of a single power it instantiates. 
Another controversy concerns the way powers operate. One 
view has it that this involves the power being ‘triggered’ by 
some stimulus, which leads to the production of the mani-
festation. The other holds that when a power produces its 
manifestation, this always involves mutual action with other 
powers.
Single-track powers have only a single manifestation, or 
perhaps a single manifestation type. Whenever a single-track 
power manifests, and in whatever circumstances it does so, 
the manner in which it manifests is the same. Conversely, 
multi-track powers are directed towards a range of different 
manifestations, and so on two different occasions, when such 
a power manifests, it may manifest in different ways, depend-
ing on the circumstances in question. There are at least two 
ways in which a power might be multi-track. Neil Williams 
(2011) discusses cases of quantitative multi-tracking, where 
a single power is directed towards a range of manifestations 
which are similar but differ with regards to degree: for 
instance, consider the elasticity of a particular rubber band. 
This power might be conceived as the power to undergo 
deformation followed by a return to original shape within a 
given range: you can stretch the rubber band by two, three 
or five centimetres, but stretch it too far and it will snap. The 
thought is that all these various manifestations should be 
attributed to just the one power: it would be wrong, having 
observed the various deformations the band can undergo, to 
hold that it had a group of distinct powers such as the-power-
to-stretch-by-two-centimetres, the-power-to-stretch-by-three-
centimetres and so on.
Vetter (2013) and Heil (2003) have both discussed cases 
of qualitative multi-tracking. In these cases, unlike the quan-
titative cases, a single power can be directed towards a range 
of manifestations not just of differing degree, but which dif-
fer by type. Heil writes:
“Consider a simple case, the sphericity of a particular 
ball. The ball’s sphericity, in concert with incoming 
light radiation, structures outgoing radiation in a defi-
nite way. The very same property of the ball disposes 
it to produce a concave depression in a lump of clay 
or to roll... one disposition, many different kinds of 
manifestation.” (2003, pp. 198–199).
Both quantitative and qualitative conceptions of multi-
tracking allow that a given power might have a relatively 
restricted number of tracks, or might have a very large, 
maybe even infinite, number of tracks—Martin (2008) holds 
the latter view. Some proponents of single-tracking, for 
instance Lowe (2010), have argued that quantitative multi-
tracking should not be accepted as ‘genuine’ multi-track-
ing, as the various tracks can be subsumed under a single 
manifestation-type and unifying description. Quantitative 
multi-trackers, for instance Williams (2011), have however 
provided counter-arguments to this claim. It should be clear 
that whether powers are single- or multi-track has important 
ramifications for how we identify and individuate powers, 
both theoretically and empirically: at least under certain 
conditions, the two camps disagree both over the number of 
powers that a candidate object instantiates, and with regards 
to what constitutes evidence in favour of attributing a power 
to an object.
Another issue concerning the nature of powers involves 
considering how it is that they come to manifest, that is, how 
they operate. Different accounts of how powers operate are 
no less important to determining the identity of a power than 
is the manifestation(s) towards which the power is directed.
One account of how powers operate is the ‘stimulus-
manifestation’ model, which is arguably the orthodox 
position in the contemporary literature (e.g Bird 2007). 
According to this account, a causal power will only give 
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rise to a manifestation when it is galvanised into action 
by some trigger or stimulus. For instance, in the case 
of the fragility of a vase, the stimulus might be ‘being 
struck with a force greater than X’, or in the case of the 
solubility of a sample of salt, ‘being submerged in water’. 
The manifestation is produced by the target power alone, 
although it will not be produced until the occurrence 
of the stimulus. Thus, on this account a power’s nature 
could be specified in terms of a relationship between the 
power, its manifestation or manifestations and a stimulus 
or some stimuli. Tugby (2010) has argued that stimuli 
needn’t themselves be powers, and that there may be a 
certain heterogeneity with regard to the nature of stimuli. 
For instance, stimuli may be actions such as ‘being struck 
with a force greater than X’; or they may be states such as 
‘being submerged in water’.
An alternative account is the ‘mutual manifestation’ 
model. According to this view, in order for some mani-
festation to occur, there must always be at least two pow-
ers working together to bring it about. When they do so, 
there is no sense of priority such that one power could be 
considered the operative power, whilst the other is held 
to have merely stimulated or triggered it. For instance, in 
the case of the production of a particular vase’s shatter-
ing, this view would hold that this is not the result of the 
‘fragility’ of the vase alone, but rather of a whole host 
of causal powers of the vase, of the object that struck it, 
and perhaps more besides. Likewise, the dissolution of a 
sample of salt is a result of the mutual action of both the 
particular crystalline structure of the salt and the dipole 
moment typical of  H2O molecules (and perhaps more 
besides). Thus, on this account a power’s nature could be 
specified in terms of a relationship between the power, its 
manifestation or manifestations and the partner or part-
ners with which the power mutually manifests.
The mutual manifestation view allows that powers 
operate in a pair-wise manner and also that higher-adicity 
interactions are possible. Indeed, Tugby (2013) argues 
that there are both empirical and metaphysical reasons to 
support the claim that those who hold a mutual manifes-
tation view should allow for interactions involving more 
than two powers. This account of the manner in which 
powers operate is defended, amongst others, by Martin 
(2008), Heil (2003), Mumford and Anjum (2011) and 
Tugby (2013).
Both debates discussed so far—that is, the tracking and 
operation of powers—have ramifications for how powers 
are identified and individuated. Thus, anyone hoping to 
deploy the notion of powers should take into account how 
their resolution might impact upon the given context in 
which the notion is used—in this case, on the notion of 
strong emergence.
4  Four Accounts of Causal Powers
The distinctions between single- and multi-tracking, and 
between the stimulus-manifestation and mutual manifes-
tation views can be cross-combined to frame four distinct 
accounts of causal powers. This paper will not address 
arguments for or against these four accounts, although it 
will be indicated where and by whom each account, or at 
least something like them, are defended or discussed in the 
literature.
In what follows the four views of powers will be illus-
trated partially by use of diagrams, and so a quick note is 
required to explain how these are to be interpreted. The dia-
grams consist of letters standing for various phenomena, 
which are labelled by use of numbers in subscript; and of 
arrows connecting the letters. In each diagram, ‘S’ stands for 
‘stimulus’; ‘P’ stands for ‘power’, and ‘M’ stands for ‘mani-
festation’. Sameness of subscript implies type-identity/exact 
similarity; difference of subscript implies type-non-identity/
lack of exact similarity: for instance, where ‘S1’ appears in 
two different diagrams, it picks out two instances of the same 
stimulus, say ‘being struck with a force greater than X’, and 
where ‘S1’ and ‘S2’ appear either in the same or different 
diagrams, they pick out instances of different stimuli, say 
‘being struck with a force greater than X’ and ‘being sub-
merged in water’ respectively. The arrows are a placeholder 
for the obtaining of some relationship or other the precise 
nature of which needn’t detain us here and may not pick out 
the same relationship every time they appear even within 
a diagram. Thus, it might be natural to read the following 
(Fig. 1): as, ‘S stimulates P to produce M’, where the text in 
italics picks out the relevant relationships. Where multi-track 
powers are represented, different styles of line such as solid, 
dotted or dashed, indicate which stimulus/pairing produces 
which manifestation.
4.1  Single‑Track Stimulus Manifestation
On this view, the identity of a power can be specified as a 
triadic relationship between a single stimulus; the power, 
and a single manifestation, as depicted in Fig. 2.
One consequence of such an account is that powers are 
individuated both by their specific stimulus and the spe-
cific manifestation towards which they are directed. Thus, 
the very same manifestation, if it occurs following distinct 
stimuli, must be brought about by a distinct power (as in the 
top two lines of Fig. 2). Likewise, the very same stimulus 
S P M
Fig. 1  Schematic diagram representing the stimulus-power-manifes-
tation relationship
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can lead to different manifestations when it triggers different 
powers (as in the top and bottom lines of Fig. 2). This way 
of thinking about powers aligns most closely with CP, intro-
duced earlier, and is arguably the orthodox conception of 
causal powers. It is defended by Bird (2007) amongst others.
4.2  Multi‑track Stimulus Manifestation
One can hold that the powers operate on the stimulus-man-
ifestation model and reject single-tracking. For instance, 
Williams says:
“Powers [directed towards multiple manifestations] 
would be single powers that respond differently for 
different stimuli—and that just is what it is to be a 
multi-track power.” (2011, p. 590)
On this view the identity of a power at least partly con-
sists in an n-adic relationship between the power, a set of 
stimuli and a set of manifestations. This view has the inter-
esting consequence that the very same manifestation can 
occur on two occasions following the very same stimuli 
but be due to a different power in each case (as depicted 
in Fig. 3 when looking at stimulus-power-manifestation 
triads indicated with solid-line arrows in each diagram). 
Two distinct powers thus may manifest in the same way in 
a variety of situations, but differently in others.
There are interesting ramifications of this view for the 
epistemology of powers: two distinct powers may overlap 
with regard to almost all their ‘tracks’, and all the stimuli 
that they typically encounter might produce the very same 
manifestations. Nevertheless, there may be some highly 
atypical stimuli which would differentiate them, although 
in fact we are rarely or never in a position to observe the 
manifestation brought about by this atypical, differentiat-
ing stimulus.
4.3  Single‑Track Mutual Manifestation
Another option is that powers are single-track but operate 
according to the mutual manifestation model. Thus, the 
identity of a given power at least partly consists in a rela-
tionship between the power, a manifestation and at least 
one other ‘partner’ power. On this view, because powers 
are held to be single-track, it cannot be the case that the 
very same power can produce different manifestations with 
different partners.
Whilst the other views in this section find explicit defend-
ers in the literature, I am not aware of anyone who self-
consciously endorses the single-track mutual manifestation 
model. However, something like this view is perhaps that 
held by those who distinguish between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ 
powers or causal powers and causal liabilities (e.g. Lowe 
2013), where in order for some manifestation to occur—say 
salt’s dissolving in water—the water must have the ‘active’ 
power to dissolve and the salt the ‘passive’ power or liability 
to be dissolved. On such a view, there is a single typifying 
manifestation, but multiple powers are required for its pro-
duction (Fig. 4).
A couple of points to note: first, few supporters of mutual 
manifestation also endorse the active/passive distinction—
the idea is not to run these two views together, but to attempt 
to provide an example of a specifically single-track mutual 
manifestation view; second, it is probably possible to com-
bine the active/passive distinction with multi-tracking, but 
the way the view is most typically expressed seems to align 
it more with a single-track approach.
S1  P1 M1
S2 P2 M1
S1  P3 M3
Fig. 2  Single-track stimulus manifestation powers
S1 M1
P1
S2 M2
S1 M1
P2
S3 M3
Fig. 3  Multi-track stimulus manifestation powers
P1  M1 P2
P3 M2 P4
Fig. 4  Single-track mutual manifestation powers
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4.4  Multi‑track Mutual Manifestation
The final account combines the mutual manifestation 
model of how powers operate with the view that powers are 
multi-track. On such a view, the identity of a power could 
be specified in terms of an n-adic relationship between the 
power, a set of manifestations and a set of mutual partners. 
This kind of view might suggest a holism about the identity 
of powers, for instance, see Martin (2008).
Thus, two distinct powers may manifest in the same way 
in a variety of situations, but differently in others—and 
indeed may share almost all their typical mutual partners, 
as is the case with  P1 and  P2 in Fig. 5, which has simi-
lar consequences for the epistemology of powers as those 
mentioned in Sect. 4.2 when discussing the multi-track 
stimulus manifestation view. Likewise, this view has the 
consequence that two distinct powers may share all their 
manifestations, but be genuinely distinct because some or 
all of them are brought about with different partners, as is 
the case with  P1 and  P3 in Fig. 5.
This sort of view is advanced in Martin (2008) and Heil 
(2003).
Having outlined these four different approaches to the 
identity and individuation of causal powers, we are now in 
a position to examine how adopting each approach might 
bear on the debate between concerning strong emergence, 
when emergence is cashed out in terms of novel causal 
powers.
5  Theories of Causal Powers 
and the Emergence–Reduction Debate
Consider a dialectic which is common in the debate 
between emergentists and reductionists: first, some distinc-
tive form of behaviour or phenomena which only occurs in 
certain complex situations is identified which, prima facie, 
is candidate evidence of emergence. In the case of the 
mind, the manifestation of experiential qualities or inten-
tional states could be considered examples of this kind: as 
far as we know, it is only when certain highly specific and 
complex conditions are met—those required to sustain a 
functioning brain in a living body—that these phenomena 
occur. It is then open for debate whether or not the powers 
which are usually attributed to the relatively simple com-
ponents of this complex situation are sufficient to account 
for the behaviour or phenomena—in the case of the mind, 
whether neurons and synapses, or perhaps fundamental 
particles, are endowed with the relevant powers to bring 
about the manifestation of apparently distinctive mental 
phenomena. If there are grounds to think they are suf-
ficient, then the prospects for reduction look good. If not, 
then there is at least prima facie warrant for the emergen-
tist to argue that a strongly emergent entity—such as the 
mind, considered as distinct from and novel with respect 
to, even if dependent on, the brain—ought to be posited 
which is endowed with the relevant causal power(s) to 
account for the behaviour or phenomena.
The final sections of this paper will attempt to show 
that the way this dialectic plays out is crucially sensitive 
to the way in which the relationship between powers and 
their manifestations is conceived—that is, to which of the 
accounts of the identity and individuation of powers out-
lined above is assumed.
5.1  Examples of Emergence
When presented with a putative example of emergence and 
faced with the sort of dialectical situation outlined above, 
it will typically be the case that the available empirical 
evidence does not determine whether one ought to take 
an emergentist or reductionist attitude towards the case 
at hand. Why should this be the case? One reason is that 
empirical evidence is unlikely to ever determine that a 
case is a genuine case of emergence, for claims that a 
given phenomenon is emergent will always be defeasi-
ble: future evidence might show that some higher-level 
phenomenon which appeared to be emergent can in fact 
be fully accounted for by (previously undiscovered or not 
fully understood) features of the lower-level base phenom-
ena upon which it depends. That this is the case implies 
that, at least in principle, the evidence might determine 
M1 P4
P1 M2 P5
M3 P6
M1 P4
P2 M2 P5
M4 P6
M1 P4
P3 M2 P5
M3 P7
Fig. 5  Multi-track mutual manifestation powers
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that one takes a reductionist attitude to a putative case 
of emergence. However, generally speaking, when some 
higher-level phenomenon is picked out as a putative exam-
ple of genuine metaphysical emergence—such as the 
mind—compelling empirical evidence in favour of reduc-
tionism is absent: if such evidence were available, then the 
phenomenon in question would not have been selected as 
an example of emergence in the first place.
One might be tempted to think that the defeasible nature of 
any given putative case of emergence automatically favours 
reductionism—at least when coupled with some form of 
optimistic meta-induction that observes that many previous 
putative examples of emergence have been overturned and 
reasons that this trend will continue. This line of thought, 
however tempting, should be resisted. First, it is a highly-
contentious matter as to just how many successful reductions 
have in fact been achieved and this contention thus carries 
over to the basis on which such an induction might be made. 
Second, putative examples of emergence, both currently 
and historically, are a highly heterogeneous group: chemi-
cal properties (e.g. Hendry 2010); the elan vital (introduced 
by Bergson, e.g. 1998 [1911]); folding behaviour in proteins 
(e.g. McCleish 2017); condensed matter phenomena such 
as the Fractional Quantum Hall effect (e.g. Lancaster and 
Pexton 2015); mental phenomena such as conscious experi-
ence (e.g. O’Connor and Jacobs 2003)... the list goes on. This 
heterogeneity means that over-arching inductions such as 
the one sketched above are likely to be inappropriate unless 
relevant similarity between cases can be demonstrated: that 
the elan vital has been explained away, say, may have little 
relevance to the question of whether conscious experience is 
a strongly emergent phenomenon. For similar reasons, it is 
unlikely that any general inductive argument could be run in 
the opposite direction, favouring emergentism.
In the absence of determining empirical evidence or gen-
eral arguments, whether one should take a putative exam-
ple of strong emergence seriously or not will be a matter 
of balancing various considerations to decide between the 
competing views. The next section will address one sort of 
consideration that will play a key role: the degree to which 
the putative example of emergence strikes one as genuinely 
surprising, novel and distinctive with respect to the lower-
level phenomena from which it is claimed to emerge.
5.2  Multi‑tracking: A Worry for Emergentism
Consider first the multi-track mutual manifestation and 
multi-track stimulus manifestation views. According to 
these accounts of powers (especially those versions which 
endorse qualitative multi-tracking), what manifestation will 
issue from the operation of a power on a given occasion is 
highly context sensitive and will not be determined by the 
power alone.
If the multi-track mutual manifestation view is correct, 
then any given power is directed towards a wide range of 
different manifestations, and which manifestation occurs on 
a given occasion will be determined by which mutual mani-
festation partners the power interacts with on that occasion. 
Thus, it is built into this conception of powers that the very 
same powers will manifest differently—perhaps radically 
differently—in different complex situations. On the multi-
track stimulus manifestation view, powers have a range of 
manifestations, and which occurs on a given occasion will 
again be highly context sensitive, conditioned not on other 
powers with which the power works together, but rather on 
what particular stimulus triggers the operation of the power 
on the relevant occasion. Again, it should be expected on 
this view that the very same power manifests differently in 
different complex situations, just as with the account dis-
cussed above.
Thus on either of these views it should be expected that 
in different complex situations diverse manifestations will 
occur, even given relatively few basic powers. Certain mani-
festations may not occur in any situation except for one with 
some highly-specific make up. How does this impact upon 
the debate between emergentists and reductionists? In a can-
didate example of emergence, the impetus to posit genuinely 
novel and distinct entities to account for some idiosyncratic 
behaviour which occurs only when certain complex situa-
tions are realised is dependent on the notion that the powers 
or properties of the base entities are not sufficient to account 
for or produce that behaviour—either alone or in combina-
tion. But multi-track views call this notion into question: this 
account of powers allows that the very same powers can do 
wildly different things in different circumstances.
This provides a framework for a reductionist response to 
any candidate example of emergence. Whilst the reductionist 
may concede that candidate examples of strong emergence 
involve behaviour which only occurs when certain complex 
situations are realised and which could not be predicted from 
knowledge of how the components of such situations behave 
in other context; they can resist the claim that this epistemic 
gap warrants an ontological bridge. Rather, they can situ-
ate the novelty and distinctness that the strong emergentist 
locates in distinctive higher-level objects or properties in the 
multi-track powers of the base entities themselves: the real-
istation of certain complex situations brings together part-
nerings of powers, or allows for specific stimuli, which could 
not occur outside of those situations, and this accounts for 
the powers of the base entities making manifest behaviour 
which could not occur otherwise—manifestations towards 
which the powers of the base entities were directed to all 
along, but which could only be made manifest in specific, 
complex circumstances. Thus, apparent examples of emer-
gent phenomena are just that: appearances. There may be 
epistemic emergence, but there is no need to posit novel 
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properties or powers to account for novel behaviour, and 
therefore candidate examples of emergence do not involve 
any genuine ontological novelty.
It remains for the reductionist to provide positive reasons 
for thinking that this ontologically deflationary account 
of apparently emergent phenomena is preferable to strong 
emergentism. Without such reasons, the emergentist might 
complain that at best multi-tracking offers a possible reduc-
tionist alternative, but the potential for an alternative account 
doesn’t favour one account or the other: at best, the debate 
might have arrived at a stalemate. There are at least two ways 
in which the reductionist might provide positive reasons. The 
first would involve outlining a plausible mechanism by which 
powers might combine such that they would produce certain 
kinds of novel behaviour only in certain specific circum-
stances. Whilst there isn’t space in this paper to address this 
issue in detail, there have been attempts in the powers litera-
ture to outline just such a mechanism, in particular through 
discussions of non-additive and non-linear composition rules 
for powers (e.g. Mumford and Anjum 2011, ch. 4).
In combination with the first reason, the reductionist 
might note that once one has both an account of powers in 
place which accommodates novel behaviour without genu-
ine ontological novelty, and one has outlined a plausible 
mechanism by which the powers of base entities might pro-
duce novel manifestations in complex situations (in the form, 
say, of non-additive and non-linear composition rules), then 
theory choice considerations favour the reductionist account, 
and so there is no stalemate situation. The proposed reduc-
tionist account will have advantages over the emergentist 
alternative in terms of parsimony: it posits fewer entities, 
of fewer distinct kinds, to explain the same phenomena. It 
might also be thought to be more unificatory than the emer-
gentist alternative: as noted earlier, candidate examples of 
emergence are highly heterogeneous, and where the emer-
gentist will need to posit a distinct ontological regime to 
account for each, the reductionist appealing to multi-track 
powers of base entities will subsume all cases under a sin-
gle explanatory framework. Thus, there are positive reasons 
for supporting the reductionist account once a multi-track 
account of powers is adopted.3
Whilst multi-tracking views may not strictly entail the fal-
sity of emergentism, they seriously undercut the warrant for 
appealing to genuine ontological novelty to account for novel 
behaviour: that novel manifestations occur in such situations 
is to be expected, and so one needn’t posit exotic emergent 
higher-level phenomena to explain their occurrence. One 
way of thinking about this problem is as a specific version 
of the ‘collapse objection’ which holds that apparently emer-
gent entities will, on closer inspection, collapse to lower-
level entities (e.g. Taylor 2015). Thus, it seems that if this 
is the view of powers assumed, then it becomes very hard 
to see what sort of evidence the emergentist could bring 
forward to support their case, and the debate is prejudiced 
in favour of reductionism.
5.3  A Problem Concerning Single‑Track Partner 
Powers
According to the single-track mutual manifestation view, 
for a power to produce its manifestation it needs to work in 
concert with one or more specific partners which are also 
directed towards producing just that manifestation with just 
those partners. Remember, on this view, as each power is 
directed towards a single manifestation type, the candidate 
example of emergence being considered cannot be explained 
away by appeal to the complexity of the situation, as dis-
cussed above: in order to account for the novel behaviour or 
phenomena, no power directed towards any other manifesta-
tion—so no power of the entities involved in that situation 
that manifest otherwise—can be called upon, for then these 
would be multi-track powers. It seems then, that if this view 
were correct, then there would be warrant for supposing that 
some genuinely novel powers are operating to bring about 
the manifestation which constitutes the candidate example 
of emergence. This account allows for, but doesn’t entail, 
strong emergence in a way that the two accounts previously 
discussed do not.
But there is an interesting, and perhaps uncomfortable, 
consequence of this view for emergentists. What the view 
requires is that for the emergent power to manifest, there 
must be some partner or partners present for it to do so—
partner(s) directed toward producing the very same manifes-
tation, and nothing else. The emergentist faces something of 
a dilemma: either the partner power is also emergent, or it 
belongs to the base entities. Each option has its drawbacks. 
If the partner is also emergent, then it seems that the ‘down-
wards’ causal force many emergentists want to ascribe to 
emergent entities is lacking. But if the partners are powers of 
the base entities, then it seems we must endow these entities 
with a whole host of powers directed towards manifestations 
with various potential emergent powers.
The problem here is not a general one concerning 
partnering between different ‘levels’, nor is it a problem 
3 Shoemaker (2007, ch. 4) has suggested a similar response to emer-
gentism that appeal to ‘micro-latent’ powers. Briefly, the idea is that 
novel behaviour could be accounted for in terms of the manifestations 
of (single-track) powers of the base entity which are only triggered in 
certain complex situations. This response, however, will have a much 
harder time meeting the challenge to provide positive support than 
the multi-track account outlined above. The account will not be more 
parsimonious than the emergentist alternative, as it must posit distinct 
powers to account for novel behaviour (it simply locates them at the 
lower, rather than higher, level). And the account will not be unify-
ing—it will need to posit distinctive sets of powers for each candidate 
example of emergent phenomena.
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concerning familiar issues such causal closure. Rather, 
the worry is this. If:
 (i) powers are single-track—that is, directed to only a 
single manifestation
 (ii) powers operate according to the mutual manifesta-
tion model—that is, they require partner powers to 
manifest
 (iii) emergent powers partner with powers of the base 
entities
Then the base entities will have to be endowed with 
‘bespoke’ partner powers for every kind of emergent 
power. Suppose that some set of physical fundamentals 
the Bs constitute the base entities. And suppose that 
there is relatively widespread strong emergence: when 
the Bs are in the right arrangements, there are emergent 
chemical powers, biological powers, mental powers (and 
so on). Then, for these emergent powers to have part-
ners (and given the singly-track mutual manifestation 
model, remember each power must have it’s own specific 
partner(s), as discussed in Sect. 4.3—if partners could do 
‘double duty’, then they’d be multi-track), the base enti-
ties the Bs must be endowed with specific partners-for-
the-chemical-powers, partners-for-the-biological-powers, 
partners-for-the-mental-powers and so on. And these will 
have to be distinct from the powers the Bs have which 
account for all their ‘B-level’ interactions.
Perhaps the emergentist could bite the bullet, and sim-
ply accept that this is how it is with emergent powers 
and their basal partners. The picture sketched above isn’t 
incoherent. It is, however, undesirable in several ways. 
First, it might strike some as overly costly: basal entities 
now need to be ascribed a whole host of additional pow-
ers. Second, there might be a concern that there’s an ad 
hoc element to this account: we start with the emergent 
powers and then basal partners get projected ‘down’ from 
the emergent level simply on the grounds that emergent 
powers are in need of them. Third, one might be con-
cerned that this account threatens the sense of novelty 
that emergence typically requires: if the base entities are 
such that they have always had specific partner powers 
‘ready to go’ for emergent powers, then it’s almost as if 
the emergent entity is somehow prefigured in the basal 
entities themselves.
Adopting the single-track mutual-manifestation account 
of powers presents, at the very least, a set of challeng-
ing problems for the emergentist. Maybe a sensible strong 
emergentist position could be developed which can deal 
with the worries raised above, but this is work yet to be 
done.
5.4  Powers for Emergentists
This leaves the single-track stimulus manifestation account 
of powers, which appears to be the most felicitous for strong 
emergentists. On this view, each power is directed towards 
just one manifestation type, and so the presence of a novel 
manifestation in the form of idiosyncratic behaviour or phe-
nomena in some complex situation gives warrant for positing 
a new power. And unlike the single-track mutual manifesta-
tion account, the positing of that new power doesn’t entail 
the positing of further powers in order to allow it to operate: 
on the single-track stimulus manifestation view the manifes-
tation is brought about by the power alone, just so long as it 
is triggered by the relevant stimulus. As no further powers 
need to be posited there is no question about the status of 
these powers, and so it seems that the sorts of uncomfortable 
consequences discussed above will be avoided. One might 
think that an equivalent problem might arise concerning the 
stimulus for the power, however the view does not require 
that we posit some distinctive form of (emergent?) stimulus 
to trigger the emergent power, for it is consistent with this 
view that the very same stimuli can trigger different powers 
to produce different manifestations. Thus, worries concern-
ing costliness, ad hoc-ery and so on do not appear to arise.
The foregoing has been something of a breakneck-speed 
exploration of how adopting different conceptions of pow-
ers can impact on how contentious examples of potentially 
emergent phenomena will be assessed. Far more could be 
said about each case, but I hope that enough has been done 
to render plausible a fairly modest conclusion: if one con-
ceives of strong emergence in terms of the possession or 
bestowal of novel causal powers, then it is crucial to make 
explicit and to examine in detail how one’s conception of 
the nature of powers might influence one’s approach to the 
debate. Failure to recognise the importance of this issue 
risks parties to the debate talking past one another.
6  Concluding Remarks
Are there emergent minds, possessed of distinctive, novel 
causal powers? Can conscious experience be reduced to neu-
ral activity or micro-physical goings-on? Nothing said in 
this paper implies any answer to these or related questions 
concerning the emergence or reduction of the mind. Rather, 
the principal concern of this paper has been to show that the 
way in which certain issues in the metaphysics of powers are 
resolved has ramifications for the debate between emergen-
tists and reductionists, at least when strongly emergent enti-
ties are characterised as those entities which have or bestow 
distinctive causal powers relative to the basic entities from 
which they emerge. Relatively little attention has been paid 
thus far in the debate to the fact that there is no standard, 
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universally accepted account of the nature of ‘causal pow-
ers’ (although see Baysan and Wilson 2017 for an excellent 
paper on related topics), and that this term can pick out enti-
ties with quite radically differing identity and individuation 
conditions depending on which account is assumed.
In particular, it has been argued that accepting certain 
accounts of causal powers can prejudice the debate, in some 
cases in favour of the reductionist, in others in favour of the 
emergentist. One conclusion that can be drawn from this is 
that in order for the debate to continue in good order, it is 
essential that these potential prejudices are made explicit and 
open for assessment. What has been provided here has only 
been a brief sketch of how these issues play out, so further 
work on the topic is called for.
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